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On April 16, 1986 the California Court of Appeal for the Sec-
ond District upheld Elizabeth Bouvia's petition to remove a feeding
tube from her stomach. Approving her wishes, the court noted: "Is is
not a medical decision for her physician to make. Neither is it a legal
question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers and judges. It
is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethic committees or
courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a
competent adult is hers to make alone."'
Bouvia v. Superior Court2 caps a decade of development of
California law with respect to control of medical life support. It falls
on a background of technical development that allows the marginal
postponement of death often at great expense for an extended time.
Increasingly, someone must make a choice to allow life to end rather
than to rely on natural process. This new and unwanted obligation
has forced patients, their families, the medical community and the
courts to face issues previously avoided.
In the tradition of individual autonomy, the choice has ostensi-
bly been left to each individual patient but has usually, in fact, been
made by doctors applying "medical standards." Physicians have as-
sumed the responsibility, leaving patients and their surrogates to go
through courts to assert their right to decide. Commonly, unlike
Elizabeth Bouvia, those affected were incompetent to choose by the
critical time. Making decisions for them has proven perplexing both
to surrogate decision-makers and to reviewing courts. California cre-
ated a statutory directive through which one could make a prospec-
tive choice. Twelve years later, such a statute has been adopted by
thirty-seven other states and the District of Columbia.' It is seriously
flawed and in need of revision.
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I.
The ability, medically, to support life despite the failure of bod-
ily functions grew significantly in the latter half of this century. Ag-
gressive use of ventilators was a post World War II development.'
Dialysis machines did not become available until the sixties." Inten-
sive Care Units (ICU's), the locus of most critically ill patients, ex-
isted in about ten percent of hospitals in the sixties and are virtually
universal today. Heart and kidney transplantation, not to mention
open heart surgery and more minor replacement of arteries and
valves, have joined the repertory of medical responses. 7 Some artifi-
cial body components have been in use for some time, but artificial
hearts,8 artificial blood" and artificial skin10 are now available to add
to the reservoir of donated supply. Diagnostic improvements such as
computed tomographic (CT) and nuclear magnetic resonance
(NMR) scanners have all added greatly to the efficacy of new drugs
and procedures.11
One can see the effect of new medications and processes in the
changes in patterns of death. Contrasting the present with the turn
of the century, one notes that communicable diseases have greatly
declined as a cause of death while degenerative diseases have become
more prominent. Heart disease, cancer and cerebovascular disease
4. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL ADVANCES AND THEIR DIFFU-
SION 76 (1979).
5. Id. at 111.
6. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTENSIVE CARE UNITS (ICUs):
CLINICAL OUTCOMES, COSTS, DECISION MAKING (1984). "From 1981 AHA survey tapes it
can be estimated that 78 percent of short-term general hospitals have at least one ICU or
CCU, and that 93 percent of hospitals larger than 200 beds have a separate ICU." Id. at 15.
7. See generally U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGA-
TIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, NEW OPPOR-
TUNITIES IN TREATING KIDNEY DISEASE (1982); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DE-
CIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 1 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION REPORT].
8. See generally Bernstein, The Artificial Heart: Is it a Boon or a High-Tech Fix?, 236
NATION 71, 71-72 (1983).
9. James, Researchers Step up Efforts to Develop Synthetic Blood, Wall St. J., Sept. 4,
1987, at 17. See generally In Science, 37 CHANGING TIMES 16 (1983); Slick Substitute Does
Blood's Job, 91 SCIENCE DIGEST 76 (1983).
10. Stipp, Scientists Seeking to Put Life into Body Replacement Parts, Wall St. J., Sept.
25, 1987, at 25.




have replaced influenza, pneumonia and tuberculosis as major causes
of death.'" The dying population is older, more likely to be in a
hospital and to have suffered from the cause of their death for an
extended period than was previously true."3 By 1949, half of all
deaths occurred in hospitals. The percentage has increased about ten
percent per decade. Modern medicine has gotten the population past
life threatening diseases and to the point at which death more com-
monly comes from gradual bodily failure than from sudden infection.
Its success has, in turn, increased life expectancy thereby increasing
the elderly, more frail population.
Not surprisingly, these changes have created more disputes con-
cerning treatment of the terminally ill, some of which have found
their way to court. The litigation to date has typically concerned pe-
titions to require patients to submit to life support or to require
health care professionals to withdraw it.
The law has treated life support refusal as if it were a problem
rarely to be confronted. In fact, the choice whether to continue to
provide medical support is one that increasingly has to be made by
someone. It has been estimated that it may be involved in at least six
percent of the cases in hospital wards. 4 Statistics are difficult to
gather since death is normally recorded as having resulted from an
underlying disease rather than as a result of a decision to remove
support.' 5
A recent empirical study of long term dialysis patients'" pro-
vides some indication of the process. In a group of 1766 patients
being treated for end-stage renal disease by dialysis, 155 died be-
cause dialysis was ended.'" They represented nine percent of the pa-
tient group and twenty-two percent of those who died. Sixty-six of
them were considered competent to make their own decision and did
so, although in six cases, ending treatment was first suggested by a
physician or by family. Discontinuance did not follow a set pattern
although age and diabetes were the highest risk factors. Of the com-
petent patients who discontinued treatment, about half did so at a
12. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
13. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.
14. Lo & Schroeder, Frequency of Ethical Dilemmas in a Medical Inpatient Service,
141 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1062 (1981).
15. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7: "[I]f an otherwise dying patient
is not resuscitated in the event of cardiac arrest, or if pneumonia or kidney failure goes un-
treated, the underlying disease process is said to be the cause of death." Id. at 68-69.
16. Neu & Kjellstand, Stopping Long-Term Dialysis, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 14
(1986).
17. Id. at 15
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time during which they were not experiencing medical complica-
tions.18 Those who discontinued when a medical complication such
as amputation or blindness occurred were not distinguishable by
other characteristics from those who remained on dialysis under
those circumstances. 9
II.
Studies of attitudes about death show great diversity of opin-
ion." Some hold life very precious and want to remain alive as long
as possible irrespective of pain and discomfort." Others want death
to come quickly once they are diagnosed as incurably ill and death is
probable from their disease. 2 There are many points of view be-
tween these polar extremes.
That there is substantial interest in hastening rather than pro-
longing death is demonstrated by the apparent interest in directives
to physicians to withhold life support. An estimated five million such
directives have been executed.2 It is also popularly reported that in
the Netherlands one in six deaths were actively caused by physicians
at their patient's request.2 4
Limitation of medical life support may also become a product of
cost containment efforts. During the last few years, there has been
increased concern about the costs of health care. In fact, the United
States is the best example of the fact that expenditures on medical
care vary directly with the wealth of countries25 in the manner usu-
ally associated with luxuries and contrary to the pattern of necessi-
ties. It is easy to illustrate the high cost of medical treatment control-
ling for changes in population (i.e. by units of care). In 1950, a day's
stay in a hospital cost $14.00. It rose to $133.00 by 1975 and was at
nearly $300.00 in 1982.26 The day rate at Stanford Hospital is now
from $466 to $544 depending on room type. In real dollar terms, it
has more than doubled just since 1965.27 Medical care has grown
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id.
20. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21-22.
21. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
22. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
23. Nelson, Doctors Debate Right to Stop 'Heroic' Effort to Keep Elderly Alive, Wall
St. J., Sept. 7, 1982, at 20, col. 1.
24. 60 Minutes: The Last Right? (C.B.S. television broadcast Jan. 5, 1986). See infra
note 176.
25. MAXWELL, HEALTH AND WEALTH 41 (1981).




from 5.3% of the gross national product in 1960 to over 10% by
1984.28 Per capita annual expenditure has increased over ten times
between 1950 and 1980.29 It is especially important to note that crit-
ical care administered in Intensive Care Units constitutes ten to fif-
teen percent of that amount, about 30 billion dollars."0
Terminally ill patients account for a disproportionately high
percentage of medical costs. In 1974 Selam Mushkin 1 estimated that
over 20% of all non-psychiatric hospital and nursing home expendi-
tures in non-governmental facilities were spent on the care of the
terminally ill. Although only 5% of all Medicare enrollees died in
1967, 22% of all reimbursements were made on their behalf."2 The
Health Care Financing Administration reported that the cost of such
care ranged from nineteen to twenty-two percent of all reimbursed
Medicare charges from 1974-1976."a Detsky found that "the data
indicate that the use of resources for dying patients exceeds resources
use for other high cost patients.""4
The Massachusetts General Hospital patient classification sys-
tem and the Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System provide im-
proved data for prognosis."8 Quite consistently, there is an inverse
relationship between favorable prognosis and expenditure.3 '
The high cost of critical care both in absolute terms and in rela-
tionship to the total cost of medical care has brought considerable
current focus on it in the medical community. The fact that progno-
sis has become as reliable as it has results in some pressure for cost
28. Freedland & Schlender, National Health Expenditure Growth in the 1980's, 4
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 4 (1983).
29. Id.
30. The total cost of hospital care for 1984 was $157 billion. UNITED STATES Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRAINING NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES: ACHIEVING
QUALITY CARE AT AN AFFORDABLE COST Sept. 30, 1985, at 10. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, INTENSIVE CARE UNITS (ICUS): CLINICAL OUTCOMES, COSTS, AND DECISION
MAKING 22 (1984). The Office of Technology Assessment reported that the percentage of total
hospital care costs attributable to ICUs is 15-20%. Combining the two figures, the total cost of
ICU care for 1984 would be $23.7 to $31.5 billion. Id.
31. S. MUSHKIN, CONSUMER INCENTIVES FOR HEALTH CARE 183-216 (1974).
32. Bayer, The Care of the Terminally Ill: Mortality and Economics, 309 NEW ENG. J.
MED., 1491 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Schroeder, Showstack & Roberts, Frequency and Clinical Description of High-Cost
Patients in 17 Acute-Care Hospitals, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1979).
35. Cullen, Ferrara, Briggs, Walker & Gilbert, Survival, Hospitalization Charges and
Follow-up Results in Critically Ill Patients, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 982 (1976) [hereinafter
Cullen]; Silverman, The Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System: An Application to Acutely
Ill Cancer Patients, 3 CRIT. CARE MED. 222 (1975) [hereinafter Silverman].
36. Civetta, The Inverse Relationship Between Cost and Survival, 14 J. SURG. RES.
265 (1973).
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containment through limitations on expenditures for what is cor-
rectly perceived to be a high-risk, high-cost, low-yield group by re-
ducing marginally effective therapies, those that add only slightly to
the welfare of patients in general or those which add to welfare of
only a small group of patients."
Technological advances continue. It is not possible to be certain
about their future costs. It is always possible that low cost alterna-
tives will be found for presently expensive treatment without a dimi-
nution of effectiveness and that new therapies will provide savings
over those in place but cost savings have not been the rule to date. It
consequently seems prudent to estimate that new technology will add
to or at least maintain present costs.
The aging of the population will contribute increasingly to the
demand for expensive therapy. Critical care patients are, of course,
disproportionately elderly. 8 Consequently, even providing continued
support at present per capita levels will amount to a reduction of
available resources for patients. For example, heart transplants can-
not be provided to most of those whose lives they might extend. 9 It
is possible to acknowledge that fact without admitting to health care
rationing because it can be blamed on the scarcity of appropriate
organs to transplant. The excuse is quite temporary. Artificial hearts
have been developed and used.4 They will, no doubt, be perfected in
the near future. It is estimated that some 50,000 people per year
would be suitable candidates for such hearts. The cost, when the
device is perfected, is likely to be at least $50,000 per patient with
additional first year costs of about $100,000. The total cost would be
between 2.5 and 5 billion plus follow up costs."1 Similar expenses
attend liver and other transplants. 2 A transplant is, of course, only
one of many treatments which might be beneficial. In the United
States, an estimated two million patients die per year.48 An increas-
37. Silverman, supra note 35, at 224-25. But see Scitovsky & Capron, Medical Care at
the End of Life: The Interaction of Economics and Ethics, 7 ANN. REV. Pun. HEALTH 59, 70,
73 (1986) (asserting that the difficulty of separating dying patients from those critically ill
prospectively is insuperable and that, in fact, expenditures on those who die are actually less
than treatments for critically ill patients who survive).
38. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.
39. Efforts to improve the chances of locating a transplant organ for their children, have
led several parents recently to make public appeals on television.
40. See Bernstein, supra note 8, at 71-72.
41. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HosPI-
TAL CARE 125 (1984) [hereinafter PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION].
42. Id.
43. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: MORTALITY Part B 7 (1973); U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, FACTS OF
[Vol. 28
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ing number of patients utilize intensive care;"" the average cost for
ICU treatment is $14,000 exclusive of physician fees and many other
costs." If everyone died in an ICU, that cost alone would be 28
billion dollars-46
The pressure of costs has led a number of commentators to pre-
dict that substantial reductions in resources will follow.' 7 A common
focus of procedures which might lead to savings is reducing the
range of persons admitted to intensive care and reducing such care
for those for whom it is marginally useful. Since Great Britain has a
system which delivers health care at substantially lower costs, British
experience is one indication of the broader range of changes that
might be anticipated.
As in the United States, there is no express rationing system for
health care in Great Britain . 8 Appropriate care standards accommo-
date the more limited resources. Some practices which would be
common in the United States are rarely available but their unavaila-
bility is explained, within the system, by asserting that the treat-
ments are medically inappropriate."9 The result is reflected in stan-
dards of care which have already incorporated the scarcity of supply.
To a physician accustomed to practicing in the United States, the
standards of care would, consequently, represent substantial diminu-
tion of optimal care.
Using the magnitude of utilization in the United States as a
base, some forms of care are available in substantially reduced mea-
sure in Britain. Per capita expenditures run about one third as high
as those in the United States." The British perform half as many X-
rays and use half as much X-ray film for each examination as in the
United States."' The rate of treatment for chronic renal failure is
less than half.52 Dialysis is carried out at less than one third the
LIFE AND DEATH 31 (1978).
44. See generally Greenberg, Forward Cautiously, With The Forward Plan for Health,
293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673 (1975). Singer, Rationing Intensive Care: Physician Responses
to a Resource Shortage, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1153 (1983).
45. Cullen, supra note 35.
46. Cullen, supra note 35, at 986.
47. See, e.g., PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 122; Mechanic, Cost Contain-
ment and the Quality of Medical Care: Rationing Strategies in an Era of Constrained Re-
sources, 63 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. HEALTH & Soc. 453 (1985) [hereinafter Mechanic].
48. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 123-24.
49. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 25.
50. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 84.
51. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
52. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
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United States' rate.58 Parenteral nutrition is used one quarter as
often and CT-scanning equipment is only one-sixth of that available
here."' Coronary-artery surgery which has become an important life
sustaining procedure in the United States is performed in Britain
one tenth as often as in the United States.55 Intensive care beds are
available in numbers one fifth to one tenth as many.56 Undoubtedly,
British expenditures are quite lavish when compared to expenditures
in underdeveloped countries.
There are other British treatments and procedures which are
provided as readily as in the United States. These include treatment
for hemophilia, radiotherapy for cancer, bone marrow transplanta-
tion, and chemotherapy for cancer of the sort highly responsive to
such treatment (far less for less responsive sorts).57 The reasons un-
derlying the difference are not officially articulated but one can spec-
ulate about some of them. There seems to be a preference for treat-
ing those who will benefit the most. Thus, treatment for hemophilia,
which strikes young patients, is applied less frequently while dialy-
sis- mostly required for the elderly is utilized far less.5" Chemother-
apy in the most tractable cases is on par with the United States and
in more hopeless cases far more rare.59 Relative expense probably
explains the dirth of CT scan equipment.
A lack of formal rationing and medical justification of the stan-
dard of care being applied tends to obscure the relative scarcity of
the extant system. Some clues help to illuminate the matter. The
existence of queues, for example, indicates unmet demand. In Brit-
ain in 1979, of 566,000 patients awaiting surgery of all kinds, thirty-
one percent had waited for more than one year. Seven percent of
those on the waiting list were classified urgent and nearly three
fourths of them had been waiting more than a month.60 In the
United States, on the other hand, there appears to be a surplus of
available hospital space and surgical talent despite some local
shortages."' With the exception of organ transplants, there appears
53. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
54. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
55. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
56. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
57. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
58. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 29-31, 37-40.
59. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41, at 28.
60. Aaron & Schwartz, "Special Report" Rationing Hospital Care: Lessons from Brit-
ain, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52, 54 (1984) [hereinafter Aaron & Schwartz].
61. TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENT'S PRI-
[Vol. 28
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to be no queue for medical procedures. Organ transplant procedures
have escaped public wrath in part because the supply of organs is so
short as to mask the rationing which takes place. When rationing
criteria come to light they can evoke heated condemnation. 2
Physicians say that they generally provide appropriate services
on a first come first served basis if there are any temporary
shortages. A study of practices during an extended nursing strike,
supports this viewpoint." Most notably, the death rate appeared not
to have been affected by the cutbacks suggesting that the attention to
the admitted critically ill was maintained functionally static.6" Most
of those who write about the need to ration available treatments
speak of the problem as though it looms in the future but does not
exist today.6 5
Aaron and Schwartz,66 who have compared the British and
American systems, come to the conclusion that while the American
system can absorb mild budget cuts without changing the provision
of services significantly, severe cuts would lead to following the Brit-
ish archetype.6 7 In such a future, they conclude, terminal care would
be much reduced. The reduction would follow redefinitions of stan-
dard medical care. According to Lo and Jonsen, some categorical re-
moval of patients from life support by redefinition of appropriate
care standards has already taken place in the United States. Patients
with end-stage lung disease are generally not financed for extended
use of ventilators. Patients with intractable gastrointestinal hemor-
rhage do not receive unlimited quantities of blood. Neither practice
has been formally proposed or defended. 8
Although he has not obtained much following for his position,
former Colorado governor Lamm has strongly advocated reduction of
VATE SECTOR ON COST CONTROL 62 (1983); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 48 (1984).
62. In June 1986, Loma Linda University Medical Center refused to consider an infant,
Baby Jesse, for a desperately needed heart transplant because his young parents were unmar-
ried. Loma Linda felt that they were unprepared to give Baby Jesse the extensive post-opera-
tive care which would be required. Loma Linda offered the baby's parents a compromise: if
they would give up custody of Jesse to his grandparents, it would consider him for a trans-
plant. The parents agreed, and Jesse ultimately received a heart after a well-publicized battle.
Wallis, Of Television and Transplants, TIME, June 23, 1986, at 68, 127.
63. Singer, Carr, Mulley & Thibault, Rationing Intensive Care -Physician Responses
to a Resource Shortage, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1155, 1158 (1983).
64. Id. at 1159.
65. See, e.g., Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 52.
66. PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION, supra note 41.
67. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
68. Lo & Jonsen, Clinical Decisions to Limit Treatment, 93 ANN. INTERN. MED. 764
(1980).
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expenditures on health care for the elderly.69 He proposed redi-
recting the resources to meeting the needs of groups who have not
already had as extensive use of public benefits as the elderly.
While his position has drawn strong criticism, it raises perspec-
tives which cannot be ignored. As previously mentioned, the increas-
ing elderly population is causing unprecedented medical expenses. 7°
Likewise, the different costs of their care are creating other financial
crises. The social security system is in danger.71 Non-medical facili-
ties to provide food and shelter are inadequate both in numbers and
in quality. 7' The lower fertility of recent generations 7 has left a
smaller number of workers to provide the resources with which to
provide for their elders. In many respects the deficits of the present
are legacies created by the expenditures of the elderly for which pay-
ment will be extracted from the young. A rebellion against a future
in which such burdens increase seems quite plausible. Hints of
sharper future generational divisions are already abundant.74
The law respecting a right to choice has also seen a period of
rapid acceleration. Before this decade of active litigation concerning
life support removal, few cases had tested a patient's control of re-
fusal of medical procedures. Some cases announced the paramount
right of patients to control the limits of their treatment even if death
resulted, 75 but several well known cases concerning Jehovah's Wit-
ness patients are contrary.7 In those cases, courts ordered blood
69. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1984, at A16, col. 4; N.Y. Times, April 1, 1984, at A22,
col. 1.
70. Mechanic, supra note 47, at 465-66.
71. N.Y. TIMES, FEBRUARY 16, 1984, at A23, COL. 1. (Report by Committee for Eco-
nomic Development warns that if U.S. economy does not perform as well as Congress expects,
Social Security could reach another crisis in the 1980s. The 1983 amendments provide very
little margin of safety); N.Y. TIMES, AUGUST 14, 1985, AT Al, COL. 8.
72. Friedland & Marotto, The New Homeless and Community Public Policy (paper
presented at the 80th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington,
D.C., August 26-30, 1985).
73. Scitovsky & Capron, Medical Care at the End of Life: The Interaction of Econom-
ics and Ethics, 7 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 59, 60 (1986).
74. CALLAHAN, SETTING GOALS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY (1987);
LONGMAN, BORN TO PAY (1987); Longman, Age Wars: The Coming Battle Between Young
and Old, FUTURIST, Jan-Feb. 1986, at 8; King, The War Between the Generations, NEWS-
WEEK, Apr. 14, 1986, at 8.
75. See, e.g., Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115
(1980); Superintendent of Belehertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
76. See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Application
[Vol. 28
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transfusions over the religious objections of members who would
have died had they not received blood. In Application of the Presi-
dent and Directors of Georgetown College," a young mother of a
seven month old child was admitted to Georgetown Hospital suffer-
ing from a bleeding ulcer. When she refused a blood transfusion, the
hospital obtained a court order to administer it. The case has been
explained as having upheld the mother's duty of care for her infant
child and as lacking more general application. 8 However, subse-
quent cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses allow a patient to refuse
medical treatment even when minor children are present.79 Nonethe-
less, it has proven to be the high water mark for paternalistic inter-
vention to require treatment.
Ten years ago, the matter of Karen Quinlan began a process of
reexamination of the sparse precedents from which a consensus de-
veloped which allowed the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavior Research
(hereafter the President's Commission) to conclude that "decisions
about health care [including the choice to forego life sustaining treat-
ment] ultimately rest with competent patients.""0
In the period since In re Quinlan,81 twelve states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have produced decisions dealing with the termina-
tion of life support. 2 Although many allude to countervailing state
of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. President and Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical
Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d
622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964); In re Estate of Dorone, 349 Pa. Super. 59, 502 A.2d
1271 (1985), af'd, 539 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987). But see Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App.
1972); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
77. 331 F.2d 1000, reh'g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom.,Jones, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
78. See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. II1. 1972) (A
father can be forced to undergo a transfusion if his refusal would devastate his dependents.);
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (ordered a blood transfusion for a pregnant
woman).
79. See, e.g., Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
80. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
81. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
82. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985);
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127,
482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d
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interests in supporting life, no appellate decision has found any of
them decisive. Four interests have been mentioned: the interests in
preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the
medical profession and protecting innocent third parties.8 3 Since the
cases have typically concerned patients who were either terminally ill
or in chronic vegetative state, there was little purpose in maintaining
life for the benefit of others. It has been possible to assert that
neither suicide nor threats to the sanctity of life were involved as
resulting death occurred, it was said, because of the underlying con-
dition. Most of the decisions also fit within the ambit of prevailing
medical practice which permits allowing patients a comfortable death
when further treatment is futile. 4
Quinlan expressly based its decision on the constitutional right
of privacy and many of the later courts have agreed. 6 Massachu-
setts' Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the right "is an expres-
sion of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as
fundamental constituents of life" and that the value of life is not
lessened by a decision to refuse treatment but by the failure to allow
1334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.
2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Satz, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re
L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E. 2d 716 (1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398
Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub noa., Garger, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); State of New Mexico ex rel.
Smithv. Fort, No. 14,768 (New Mexico 1983) (order granting alternative writ of prohibition);
In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979), modified, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), cert denied sub nor., Storer v. Storer, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re
Storer, 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984); In re
Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified sub nom., In re Guardi-
anship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
83. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 181-83; Bartling,
163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (1984); Satz, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff d, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Spring, 380 Mass. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at
123 (1980); Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Commissioner of Correction v.
Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738, 370
N.E.2d at 424.
84. See Lo & Jonsen, Clinical Decisions to Limit Treatment, 93 ANN. INTERN. MED.
764, 764-68 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling, 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d
115 (1980); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified sub nom., In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
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patient choice.80 In addition to the right of privacy held to govern
such cases, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in In re Conroy87
noted that there is also a common-law right to self-determination in
these cases and that courts could rely on either. While it, as most
other courts, emphasized that neither right was absolute and re-
viewed the variety of state interests that militated against such deci-
sions, it concluded: "In cases that do not involve the protection of the
actual or potential life of someone other than the decision-maker, the
state's indirect and abstract interest in preserving the life of the com-
petent patient generally gives way to the patient's much stronger
personal interest in directing the course of his own life." 88
Despite the fact that most of the reported cases concern patients
unable to voice a choice, the courts have agreed that the rights of
choice of the competent and incompetent are identical.8 9 However
difficult to effectuate, there seems no principled reason to deny equal
rights to incompetents. Thus, recent developments in rights of choice
are probably of equal importance to both groups. Two recent Cali-
fornia cases,9" all involving competent patients, have made recent ad-
ditions to the law.
William Bartling"' was 70 years old when admitted to the
Glendale Adventist Hospital. He had emphysema, arteriosclerosis
and an abdominal aneurysm as well as a lung tumor. In taking a
sample of tissue from his tumor for biopsy, the needle punctured and
collapsed one of his lungs. His tumor proved malignant, the punc-
ture did not heal and his lung did not re-inflate. At that point, a
tracheotomy was performed and a ventilator installed. Despite his
opposition to using the machine, his doctors insisted that it remain
connected as he would die otherwise; ethical concerns barred their
acceding to his contrary wishes. Bartling tried several times to re-
move the breathing machine and finally had his hands placed in re-
strains to prevent further efforts. He brought an action to require
86. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
87. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
88. Id. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223.
89. See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Foody, 40
Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Severns, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1980); Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 102 Misc.
2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979), modified, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), cert
denied sub nom., Storer v. Storer, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
90. See infra note 97.
91. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
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that the ventilator be removed. In a deposition he indicated that he
did not want to die, that he understood that removal of the ventilator
might well cause his death and that he nonetheless wanted it re-
moved. The trial court denied his request for an injunction on the
grounds that he was neither terminally ill nor permanently comatose
and that the law permitted removal of life support only under one of
those circumstances. He appealed but died prior to the appellate
hearing, still connected to a ventilator. The court of appeals heard
the case, notwithstanding his death, because of the importance of the
issues. It reversed the lower court, stating "if the right of a patient to
self-determination as to his own medical treatment is to have any
meaning at all, it must be paramount to the patient's hospital and
doctors. The right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment
is a constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be abridged."92
Bartling v. Superior Court" left open four important issues
concerning competent patients wishing to refuse treatment. Had he
stated that he wanted to die rather than to live without a ventilator,
would the state interest in preventing suicide have overcome his in-
terest in control of his treatment? Would the court have granted his
injunction if his life expectancy in treatment had been longer? Testi-
mony in the trial court had given him up to a year to live if he could
be weaned from the ventilator. Would the same result apply if he
were less seriously ill? Could he have chosen to end artificial feeding
in place of removing his ventilator?
Bouvia answered three of them. Elizabeth Bouvia was a 28
year old woman whose cerebral palsy complicated by painful arthri-
tis has made her quadriplegic and unable even to sit upright. She
has been bedridden and in severe pain. Her ability to take nutrition
by mouth is so limited that her doctors felt it necessary to feed her
through a nasogastric tube to sustain her life. She objected and, un-
like Mr. Bartling, claimed that she wished to die rather than to un-
dergo further life in her helpless condition. When refused, she also
brought suit. To the trial court, her wish to die was an improper
motivation. Invoking the state interest in preventing suicide, it re-
fused her petition. Since that refusal, she has recanted her desire to
die but a second court did not believe her recantation. The court of
appeal, however, held that her decision to let nature take its course
was not the equivalent of a decision to commit suicide and that the
trial court erred when it made her motives determinative. Testimony
92. Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
93. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
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put her life expectancy at fifteen to twenty more years to which the
court commented, "It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical
practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that someone else
must live or, more accurately, endure, for 15 or 20 years."94 It also
found the fact that she chose to remove a nutritional tube
unexceptional.95
Although these two cases advance decisional law to some extent,
neither is very shocking. While Bartling, and Bouvia were alive
when they resisted further life support, the perception of the quality
of their remaining lives evokes outrage at the indignity of insisting
on their submission to the insertion of unwanted tubes. Although the
removal of nutritional support has been quite controversial, it has
recently been accepted by the Judicial Council of the American
Medical Association as an acceptable response to those permanently
comatose.96 New Jersey has even more recently resolved other proce-
dural questions in similar circumstances.97
94. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1143-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
95. "[S]ubstantial and respectable authority throughout the country recognize the right
which petitioner seeks to exercise. Indeed, it is neither radical nor startlingly new. It is a basic
and constitutionally protected right." Id. at 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
96. Wallis, To Feed or Not To Feed, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 60.
97. Conroy involved an eighty-four year old woman living in a nursing-home. 98 N.J.
321, 485 A.2d 1209 (1985). She was legally incompetent, but had limited ability to interact
cognitively with her environment. She had a variety of health problems which rendered her
unable to swallow enough food and fluids to sustain her life. However, she was not uncon-
scious, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state.
Ms. Conroy's nephew and guardian petitioned the court to remove the nasogastric tube
which supplied life-sustaining nutrients and fluids. The Supreme Court ultimately blocked
removal of the tube, but it establishes three tests which may be employed to remove such life-
sustaining treatment.
These tests, as the subsequent cases make clear, are limited to the factual situation at
issue in Conroy. They apply only to incompetent, elderly, nursing home-bound patients, not in
a permanent vegetative state, whose illness will result in the patient's death in a short period of
time.
There are three tests described by the court. The "subjective test" allows removal of life-
sustaining treatment whenever there is clear and convincing evidence that if the patient were
competent, he or she would have declined the treatment. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229. The
"limited-objective test" allows discontinuance of the treatment when there is some trustworthy
evidence that the patient would have declined the treatment and the surrogate decision-maker
is satisfied that the burdens of continued life outweigh the benefits. Id. at 368, 486 A.2d at
1232. The "purely objective test" permits removal of the treatment when the burdens of con-
tinued life clearly outweigh any benefits. Id.
In re Farrell involved a thirty-seven year old competent, terminally-ill patient suffering
from Lou Gehrig's disease. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987). Mrs. Farrell lived at home,
but died during the pendency of the action in the supreme court. She petitioned the court to
allow the removal of her respirator. The court found that she had the right to the removal of
the respirator; in its decision the court announced the procedures which must be followed in
the case of competent, adult patients who are living at home and request the removal of life-
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As is often true in times of social transition, case law has cre-
ated fictions to avoid affronting previously accepted norms." In life
support termination, there is a fiction of medical determinism. Pa-
tients are seen as passive victims of their illness. They do not choose
to die; death overtakes them. Their physicians do nothing to help
them die. Death overwhelms them, too.
Bartling, presumably on advice of counsel, testified that he did
not want to die. After an unsuccessful attempt to have her way de-
spite a candid admission that she proposed to starve herself to death,
Bouvia changed her story (perhaps honestly) to indicate that she
would not seek to die. That allowed the courts in both cases to adopt
the now common deterministic theme that death, when it comes,
comes from the underlying illness not the termination of treatment.9
The fiction requires that any action taken which will lead to
death be described as, at worst, surrender to the futility of further
treatment. Thus, the removal of Ms. Bouvia's nasogastric tube has to
be distinguished from discontinuing her feeding on the grounds that
inserting the tube was a medical procedure when initiated and that
its removal is the termination of a treatment. Of course, there are
valid medical aspects of artificial feeding. It has medical conse-
quences on other aspects of bodily functioning and the ability to fight
sustaining treatment:
First, it must be determined that the patient is competent and properly
informed about his or her prognosis, the alternative treatments available, and
the risk involved in the withdrawal of the life-sustaining treatment. [citation
omitted] Then it must be determined that the patient make his or her choice
voluntarily and without coercion. After these assessments have been made, the
patients' right to choose to disconnect the life-sustaining apparatus must be bal-
anced against the four potentially countervailing state interests. . . . To protect
the patient who is at home, we require that two non-attending physicians ex-
amine the patient to confirm that he or she is competent and is fully informed
about his or her prognosis, the medical alternatives available, the risk involved,
and the likely outcome if medical treatment is disconnected.
Id. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413, 415.
The court also stated that judicial review is not required except in unusual situations
where -there is a conflict among family members or the physician involved. Id.
98. See generally Campbell, Fuller On Legal Fictions, 2 LAW & PHIL. 339, 347
(1983).
99. In Bouvia, the court stated: "[Bouvia's] decision to allow nature to take its course is
not equivalent to an election to commit suicide with real parties aiding and abetting." 179 Cal.
App. 3d at 1146, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. In Bartling, the court stated: "Several doctors also
expressed the view that disconnecting Mr. Bartling's ventilator would have been tantamount to
aiding suicide. This is not the case, however, where real parties would have brought about Mr.
Bartling's death by unnatural means by disconnecting the ventilator. Rather, they would
merely have hastened his inevitable death by natural causes." 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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disease. It sometimes involves serious risks. Artificial nutrients are
readily distinguishable from normal food in appearance and formu-
lation. Eating by mouth is not. When the American Medical Associ-
ation's Judicial Council approved removing artificial feeding and hy-
dration in some instances they could discuss the matter in the same
manner as other aspects of treatment.1"'
Using medical explanations also has its utility for the courts. It
removes the responsibility for decisions that seem harsh when ex-
plained in plainer language. To let a person starve herself to death is
certainly less palatable than to permit the removal of a medical feed-
ing tube. All the better if the patient will also agree that her purpose
is not death but simply relief from the intrusion.
Rhetorical use of medical imagery to create the illusions that
underlie legal fictions does not, of course, mean that the issues are
truly medical. Blaming the underlying disease rather than the act of
life-support removal is romantic but illogical. A person who removed
a feeding tube from a recovering patient temporarily dependent on it
would have a difficult time persuading anyone that the resulting
death was caused by the underlying illness not by the removal of the
tube. Although it is true that artificial feeding differs from normal
eating, providing food and liquids is so psychologically bound to a
level of expected non-medical care that physicians, not to mention
lay people, have difficulty in equating its removal with the removal
of respirators and other less commonly provided forms of help.' To
make a case depend on whether the person wishes to die as opposed
to having necessary life support removed (a distinction the Bouvia
appellate court would not abide)"0 2 is too transparent to be useful
and too insensitive to be ethical. If she were not aware of probable
lethal consequences would she be competent to direct removal?
III.
As choice issues are masked as medical decisions, their answers
100. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
101. See generally J. QUINLAN, KAREN ANN: THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR STORY 282
(1977).
102. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. The court stated:
[T]he trial court seriously erred by basing its decision on the "motives" behind
Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to exercise her rights. If a right exists, [which the
court determines it does] it matters not what "motivates" its exercise. We find
nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse medical treatment may be exer-
cised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval. (emphasis in
original).
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are increasingly relegated to medical decision makers such as the
American Medical Association Judicial Council. At the moment, for
example, would other doctors with patients like Bouvia be prevented
from ethically removing artificial feeding on request because it has
only been officially approved for permanently comatose patients?' °
If one can believe removal of food and water can be relatively
painless," 4 it may have practical advantages. It provides a manner of
allowing death for virtually any unconscious patient. Thus, it re-
sponds to one concern about an estimated 10,000 permanently coma-
tose patients alive today. Also, unlike the removal of a ventilator
which for many would cause death in minutes, death from depriva-
tion of nutrition is likely to take place more slowly. In cases in which
death is not imminent but the patient has suffered a great loss to the
quality of life and wishes not to be rehabilitated to live under new
circumstances, food and liquid withdrawal may provide a reflective
period in which reconsideration is possible without thwarting an au-
tonomous choice to die shortly if that persists. For the physician, the
added time may provide reassurance that options have been carefully
considered by the patient, the friends and family if the patient wishes
to involve them and the hospital staff. Of course, the acceptance of
death by deprivation of nutrition has brought renewed interest in
more active lethal choices." 5
The insistence of the courts that ethical concerns of physicians
be a factor in counterbalancing the wishes of a patient for life sup-
port removal is itself a product of using medical metaphors in adju-
dicating the issue. As in the abortion cases in which a similar obfus-
cation took place, the proper role of physicians must be articulated
differently. It must really be the woman, not her physician, who de-
cides whether to carry the fetus after the physician has provided ap-
propriate information. The fact that some doctors dislike abortions
and that the Hypocratic oath prohibited them does not give physi-
cians the right to make the decision which is constitutionally pro-
tected for pregnant women. In removal of life support, Bouvia, helps
to focus a definition of an appropriate physician's role which is more
complicated than in the abortion cases.
Bouvia is clouded by the enormity of her distress as a
quadriplegic with numerous additional medical problems. If weighed
103. See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365,
529 A.2d 419 (1987).
104. See, e.g.,Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d
419 (1987); but see Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 485 A.2d 1209 (1985).
105. See infra note 176.
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by medical standards, however, the result might be more questiona-
ble. A number of others live in similar conditions. She will remain
sensate and her pain is presumably controllable with medication. It
is certainly appropriate for her physicians to feel that she can lead a
productive life, and they should be willing to contribute their skills
toward that end. That the court would not accept the physician's
conclusion in preference to hers seems to capture the appropriate
role for both. The physician's function initially is to diagnose and to
indicate the prognosis for the future. That role can be negatively
determinative but should not bar a patient's unwillingness to un-
dergo further suffering. If, for example, the physician concludes that
a patient would die shortly regardless of treatment and that treat-
ment would neither prolong life nor reduce suffering, they should
have no obligation to treat irrespective of the patient's wishes. Their
obligation then would merely be to provide for comfort to the extent
possible. The question of what is medically feasible should belong to
the experts in medicine.'0 6
Having determined that Ms. Bouvia's life support is feasible,
the balancing that remains weighs the quality of her life against the
pain and suffering that continued life promises her. Neither the doc-
tors nor the courts bring expertise to that narrow question. It has to
do with a variety of traits that are uniquely hers.'0 7 Experiences of
being dependent on others for almost all activities may seem to her
totally unacceptable while others may find such help acceptable in a
life they find productive. Her lack of personal privacy may seem in-
tolerable for reasons which may not be universal. No adequate objec-
tive measure of life quality can substitute for a personal decision.
Similarly, the fact that she refuses to consent to being nourished by
tube ought not to raise medical concerns. Whether or not tubal nu-
trition and hydration are considered treatment does not address the
question of whose decision controls whether she allows herself to be
kept alive. While the approval of the American Medical Associa-
tion's Judicial Council for removal of artificial feeding of perma-
nently comatose patients'"8 should ease the concerns of doctors, it
should not govern the limits of such removal. The patient's consent is
a necessary prerequisite to such feeding not because it is a treatment
but because the law at least makes an unconsented touching
106. Lo & Jonsen, Clinical Decisions to Limit Treatment, 93 ANN. INTERN. MED. 764,
766 (1980).
107. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21-23.
108. Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed, TIME, March 31, 1986, at 60.
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tortious,o 9
Others may seem less sympathetic in their plight than Ms.
Bouvia. Each will have to confront the quality of life that they can
anticipate if they remain alive. So long as they have had the oppor-
tunity to weigh life quality as they perceive it, it is improper to reject
their conclusion.
IV.
Many of the competent ill will not need help from courts or
hospitals if they decide to forego further life support. It is usually
possible to arrange a transfer to a doctor or institution that will view
one's plans more sympathetically or, that failing, to leave the institu-
tion and go home to die even if one's doctors disapprove.11 Problems
concerning competent patients are far less difficult than those of in-
competent individuals. All courts that have decided the issue also
have held that the right to refuse treatment was equally available to
an incompetent patient but disagreed on methods of determining the
choice." Quinlan held that Ms. Quinlan's guardian and family
109. Subsequent to the appellate decision, Ms. Bouvia filed a lawsuit against her health
care providers and the Glenchur Medical Center for battery.
110. But see Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (asserting difficulty in finding a
transfer institution).
111. See, e.g., Saikewicz, where the court noted that the doctrine of substituted judgment
should be used to determine the patient's wants and needs. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977). It stated:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making re-
sponsibility away from courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel, or
group, ad hoc, or permanent. Thus we reject the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the Quinlan case of entrusting the decision whether to continue artificial life-
support to the patients guardian, family, attending doctors and hospital 'ethics
committee.'
Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. Other courts have agreed with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's handling of the Quinlan case. In Severns, the court appointed the husband as guard-
ian of the wife's person and allowed him authority to make medical decisions for her. 421 A.2d
at 1347. The court stated: "The Court of Chancery, in our opinion, may recognize the right of
a guardian to vicariously assert the constitutional right of a comatose ward to accept medical
care or refuse it." d. at 1347. However, the court required that the guardian submit to an
evidentiary hearing before the court will grant him the authority to discontinue his wife's life
support systems.
Still other courts require a rigorous procedure be followed for terminating an incompetent
patient's life-support system. In Colyer, the court required that the following procedure be
followed to terminate an incompetent's life-support system. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738
(1983):
1. There must be a unanimous concurrence of the treating physician's diagnosis by a progno-
sis board. The prognosis board is comprised of two disinterested physicians. They must find
that the patient's condition is incurable and there is no probability that the patient will return
to a cognitive life. If no agreement can be reached, the court can make the findings by clear
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should render their best judgment of what she would have chosen to
and convincing evidence.
2. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem for the purposes representing the patient at
the guardianship hearing.
3. The appointed guardian may exercise the patient's right to refuse medical treatment only
if he deems it is in the best interest of the patient.
4. Alternatively, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem and judicially determine what is
in the best interest of the incompetent person.
Peter involved a sixty-five year old nursing home patient who was in a persistent, vegeta-
tive state with no hope of recovery, although terminally ill, she may live for an extended period
of time. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). Ms. Peter executed a durable power of attorney
which appointed a surrogate decision maker for medical decisions, but it did not specifically
authorize the removal of any life-sustaining treatment. The attorney-in-fact petitioned the
court to remove the nasogastric tube which sustained her life.
The New Jersey Supreme Court first re-emphasized its prior holding that incompetency
does not effect a patient's right to refuse or forego life sustaining treatment. "All patients,
competent or incompetent, with some limited cognitive ability or in a persistent vegetative
state, terminally ill or not terminally ill, are entitled to choose whether or not they want life-
sustaining treatment." Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 423. The New Jersey court then held that the
tests articulated in Conroy are limited to their facts; it specifically held that the limited-objec-
tive and pure objective tests are inapplicable because "by definition such patients ... do not
experience any of the benefits or burdens" which the tests attempt to balance, and the court
must instead be guided by Quinlan. Id. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 424-25. The Quinlan test
allows the guardian and family of a patient in a persistent, vegetative state to determine
whether he or she would want the life-sustaining treatment continued. If the attending physi-
cian and the hospital prognosis committee verify the patient's condition, the family or guardian
may terminate the procedures even without clear and convincing evidence that patient would
have made the same decision. They need only render their best judgment as to what decision
the patient would have wanted them to make. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 424.
However, in this case, Ms. Peter left clear and convincing evidence of her intention to
remove life support apparatus, so the court applied the Conroy subjective test. "[T]he Conroy
subjective test is applicable in every surrogate-refusal-of-treatment case, regardless of the pa-
tient's medical condition or life-expectancy." Id. Under this test, life-sustaining treatment may
be removed when there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intentions. If the
Conroy subjective test cannot be met because there is not clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's intentions, the Quinlan test must be used. Once the subjective test is met the follow-
ing procedures must be followed:
[Tihe Ombudsman . . . must be given the opportunity to investigate and pre-
vent any possible mistreatment of elderly nursing home patients who have been
declared to be in a persistent vegetative state. Therefore, before life-sustaining
treatment is withdrawn or withheld from such a patient, the surrogate decision-
maker should inform the office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Eld-
erly that a decision to forego treatment has been made. The Ombudsman should
secure two independent medical opinions to confirm the patient's medical condi-
tion, the medical alternatives available, the risks involved, the likely outcome if
medical treatment is discontinued and that there is no reasonable possibility of
the patient's recovery to a cognitive, sapient state.
Id. at 383-84, 529 A.2d at 429.
If the patient has designated a surrogate decision-maker, the Ombudsman should defer to
that person to make any decision once his or her investigatory role has been fulfilled. If there is
no surrogate specifically chosen, the Ombudsman, with the advice the attending physician,
should ascertain whether there is a close family member who is willing to make the medical
decisions. If there are no close family members, it will be necessary to have the court appoint a
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do in the circumstances. Later courts have opted for more rigorous
inquiry standards."' Substituted judgment, that is judgment made
by a surrogate on the basis of what the patient would have wished,
has been approved by courts and the President's Commission" 8 as
appropriate, at least in cases in which there is clear evidence of the
guardian. The court specifically states that a close friend is not a proper surrogate unless the
patient has formally designated that person. Id.
Jobes involved a thirty-one year old nursing-home patient in a near persistent, vegetative
state. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). Mrs. Jobes' husband petitioned the court for the
removal of the j-tube which was providing the food and hydration which sustained her life.
The court found that this case was very similar to Quinlan. The court applied Quinlan's
substituted judgment analysis to this case and found that Mrs. Jobes' j-tube should be re-
moved. In this case, Mrs. Jobes did not make known her preferences should she find herself in
a persistent, vegetative state so there is insufficient evidence to meet the Conroy clear and
convincing test. However, under the Quinlan test, the proper persons to make the substituted
judgment are the patient's family which normally would include spouse, parents, adult chil-
dren and siblings. If individuals from one of these groups is not available, the court must
appoint a guardian; the court also gives a health care professional the right to ask for a guard-
ian if he or she determines that the family is not looking out for the best interests of the
patient. Id. at 419, 529 A.2d at 448. The Quinlan test requires the concurrence of a hospital
prognosis committee which is not required in a nursing home. However, the court held that
the decision making process should be substantially similar, but it recognized that there are
safeguards present in a hospital which are not present in a nursing home. Id.
For non-elderly non-hospitalized patients in a persistent vegetative state who,
like Mrs. Jobes, have a caring family or close friend, or a court appointed
guardian in attendance, we hold that the surrogate decision-maker who declines
life-sustaining medical treatment must secure statements from at least two inde-
pendent physicians knowledgeable in neurology that the patient is in a persis-
tent vegetative state and that there is no reasonable possibility that the patient
will ever recover to a cognitive, sapient state. If the patient has an attending
physician, then that physician likewise must submit such a statement. These
independent neurological confirmations will substitute for the concurrence of the
prognosis committee for patients who are not in a hospital setting and thereby
prevent inappropriate withdrawal of treatment.
d.
Judicial review is not required for the decision to forego the life-sustaining treatment; it
may be used only in special circumstances which may occur when there is a conflict among the
family, the guardian, or the physician. Any interested person can petition the court in such a
situation. Id. at 423, 529 A.2d at 449.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the nursing home could not refuse to
participate in the withdrawal of the j-tube from Mrs. Jobes. The trial court had found that the
nursing home objected to the removal on moral grounds and that, therefore, it need not partici-
pate in the withdrawal. The supreme court found that if the nursing home were permitted to
refuse to allow the withdrawal while Mrs. Jobes was a patient there, it is likely that her
wishes may never be carried out due to the difficulty in finding a facility which would take her
and participate in the removal. Since this nursing home did not put the Jobes on notice that it
would not participate, it may not now assert their moral right. The court does not decide
whether notification would insulate a nursing home from participation in removal of the j-
tube. Id. at 425, 529 A.2d at 450.
112. See supra notes 97 & 111.
113. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 132-133.
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patient's desires. Morally and legally, this means of determining in-
dividual wishes comes closest to allowing the autonomy of competent
patients to make choices based on different perceptions of life qual-
ity. In those cases in which there is insufficient data to allow substi-
tuted judgment, some courts have adopted a best interest test by
which surrogates would decide whether to remove life support. 14
However, some courts have held that when a patient is in a persis-
tent vegetative state, a best interest test may not be used because
there are no benefits to weigh against burdens." 5 Typically, a best
interest inquiry balances the benefits and burdens of continuing
treatment. Others have refused to do so116 or have accomplished the
same end by ruling that life continuation is always in the best inter-
ests of a patient who has not indicated contrary wishes." 7
114. See, e.g., Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1984). In
Foody the court stated:
If the exercise of the right is to be maintained where no expression has been
made by an incompetent patient as to treatment, it must take place within the
context of an analysis which seeks to implement what is in the person's best
interests by reference to objective socially shared criteria.
Id. at 129, 482 A.2d at 721. See also Colyer:
A guardian of the person has the power to 'care for and maintain the incompe-
tent or disabled person, assert his or her rights and best interests, and provide
timely, informed consent to necessary medical procedures.' (quoting WASH.
REV. CODE § 11. 92.040(3))(emphasis in original) As refusal of life sustaining
treatment is an individual's personal right, we conclude that under this provi-
sion the guardian has the power to assert such a right.
99 Wash. 2d at 129, 660 P.2d at 746-47. See also Conroy where the court stated:
In the absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evidence at all, that the
patient would have declined the treatment, life-sustaining treatment may still be
withheld or withdrawn . . . if a pure-objective test is satisfied. . . . [Tihe net
burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly
outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life.
98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
115. Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987).
116. See, e.g., Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
117. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The court stated:
"Should the probate judge then be satisfied that the incompetent individual would . . . have
chosen to forego potentially life-prolonging treatment, the judge shall issue the appropriate
order. If the judge is not so persuaded, or finds that the interest of the state require it, then
treatment shall be ordered." Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 434. See also Conroy:
When the evidence is insufficient to satisfy either the limited-objective test [life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld when there is some trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have refused treatment and the decision maker is satisfied
that the burdens of continued living outweigh the benefits] or purely objective
standard [the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment clearly out-
weigh the benefits the patient derives from life], however, we cannot justify the
termination of life-sustaining treatment as clearly furthering the best interests of
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Beyond determining an appropriate standard, courts have taken
quite different approaches to questions concerning oversight of the
procedure. New Jersey's high court indicated that it expected family
concurrence and review by a hospital ethics committee.118 In the case
of patients from nursing homes, it also wanted review by an
Ombudsman already charged with oversight of the elderly in such
institutions." 9 Its Massachusetts counterpart denied the right of any
group to make such a decision without reference to courts.120 The
New Mexico Supreme Court believed itself powerless without legis-
lative direction 12' but the Legislature quickly provided a procedure
by which a substitute judgment made by all of the family in good
faith would suffice.'
22
A major problem in ascertaining the wishes of a patient has
almost always arisen from the absence of an indication of what he or
she would want done. There is general agreement that if the pa-
tient's wishes were known, they would be respected.
So long as a person continues to be conscious and is treated as
competent, individualized treatment corresponding to individual
views is possible. Making a surrogate choice for incompetents is far
more difficult.
Irrespective of how it is attempted, making decisions that dupli-
cate what another would have decided is virtually impossible. Con-
sidering the wide range in decisions which the same people make on
different occasions, the changes of mind and the alterations of atti-
tudes, it would be impossible to foretell what decision the patient
would have made at any given point. All of the prior decisions which
serve as models necessarily reflect different circumstances. They
were made when the person was healthier and able to communicate.
How would the presence of the disabilities presently plaguing him
affect the type of decision that was formerly made? Even the patient
may not have known the answer before he experienced the differing
circumstances under which he now lives. If one adds the personal
attitudes, the biases and, perhaps, the personal motives of a surro-
a patient.
98 N.J. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1233.
118. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 486 A.2d at 1242; See supra note 111.
119. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 486 A.2d at 1242.
120. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). But see Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
121. State of New Mexico ex rel. Smith v. Forte, No. 14,768 (order granting alternative
writ of prohibition).
122. In 1984, the Legislature passed the Right to Die Statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
7-1 to 24-7-11 (1984).
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gate, the result will certainly be a distortion of the decision which the
patient would have made himself. Realizing the impossibility of a
perfect result, courts or the Legislature must provide for some
method of surrogate decision making and will have to settle for the
best available even if that is quite imperfect.
The surrogates of choice have invariably been members of the
family. 2 ' However they are to make or suggest a choice respecting
treatment, they appear to courts to be those most likely to know
about the patient's habits and wishes and most likely to effectuate
them.124 The President's Commission recommends that when there
are several equally acceptable options, the one chosen should be se-
lected by the family. The involvement of the family is so well-known
that those who wish otherwise are on notice to make specific provi-
sions.125 Unfortunately, while the interests of family members may
be consistent with a patient's wishes and while they are the only
available surrogates in many cases, one must consider potential con-
flicting interests involved as well. In some cases, the family and pa-
tient will have differing religious or ethical views about death.'12
More antagonistic relationships may attend the fact that some may
have conflicting current endeavors, may be heirs on the patient's
death or may bear the financial and emotional burden of the illness.
Conservatorship disputes have certainly demonstrated the po-
tential for adversarial approaches among family members. 2 ' In their
123. See, e.g., Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Foody, 40
Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Severns, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1980); Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115(1980); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
124. See, e.g., Spring:
The judge properly relied in part on the opinion of the ward's wife of fifty-five
years. That opinion was corroborated by that of the son, and there was every
indication that there was a close relationship within the family group, that the
wife and son had only the best interest of the ward at heart, and that they were
best informed as to his likely attitude.
380 Mass. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122; see also Bludworth: "[T]he means developed by the
courts to afford this right [to refuse medical treatment] to incompetent persons is the doctrine
of 'substituted judgment.' Under this doctrine close family members substitute their judgment
for what they believe the terminally ill incompetent person, if competent, would have done
under these circumstances." 452 So. 2d at 926.
125. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 193 n.55 (citing Parker v.
United States, 406 A.2d 1275 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
126. It is less likely that such differences will exist within a family than between the
patient and another surrogate chosen from a different background, however, and the family
ought not to be disqualified on that ground alone.
127. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the
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acting as surrogates for health care, one would expect no better re-
sults than those achieved in property management. Most states
which legislatively authorize directives to physicians respecting re-
moval of life support, disqualify family members as witnesses be-
cause of such concerns. 2 ' Whatever supervisory scheme is superim-
posed on the charge to family surrogates, it is quite likely that they
will control the process in most cases because they will be accepted
as both better informed and as benevolent." 9
V.
To counterbalance reliance on such surrogates in health care
matters, the author recommended the use of health care durable
powers of attorney in a Stanford Law Review article,'3 0 suggesting
that they take the name of the far more limited natural death act
directives known popularly as "living wills." The name has not been
adopted but the device has.' Its main feature is the appointment of
Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1010-11 (1979) [hereinafter Alexander].
128. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4504 (1985); NEV. REV. CODE § 449.600 (1977).
129. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGE-
MENT (1972).
130. Alexander, supra note 127.
131. See generally ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING WILL: USING A DURABLE POWER
OF ATTORNEY (1988); ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (Repl. 1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.325,
13.26.330 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501, 14-5502 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
58-501 to 58-511 (Repl. 1971 & Supp. 1985), §§ 58-701 to 58-704 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 2400-2407, 2430-2444, 2450-2457, 2460-2473, 2500-2508, 2510-2513 (West Supp.
1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-501, 15-14 502 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-42 to 1-56 (West 1969), § 45-690 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901-
4905 (Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2081 to 21-2085 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §
709.08 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-6-5, 10-6-36 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 560:5-501, 5-502 (Repl. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-501 to 15-5-507 (Supp. 1987), §§
39-4502 to 39-4506 (Supp. 1986); 1987 ILL. PUB. ACT No. 85-701; IND. CODE §§ 30-2-11-1
to 30-2-11-7 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.705, 633.706 (West Supp. 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-610 to 58-617 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Michie
1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3027 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A §§
5-501, 5-502 (1981 & Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601 to 13-603
(1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201B, §§ 1 to 7 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.495 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 523.01 to 523.25 (West Supp. 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 87-3-13 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 486.550s-486.595 (Vernon
Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-501, 75-5-502 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-
2664 to 30-2675 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.460, 111.470 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 506:6 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2B-8, 2B-9 (West Supp. 1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501, 45-5-502 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1501 to 5-1601
(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1 to 32A-14 (1984 Supp. 1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to 30.1-30-05 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1337.09, 1337.091 (Page Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1051-1062 (West Supp.
1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.407, 126.413 (Repl. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5601-
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a surrogate of choice to direct health care and financial concerns for
those declared to be incompetent and to avoid a court imposed
guardianship or conservatorship. It seeks to retain control for the
person even though he or she is declared legally incompetent.
Some states now have specific durable powers for health care as
statutory provisions.'" 2 In other states, general durable power legis-
lation is thought to authorize the creation of health care surro-
gates.1"8 Part of the popularity of durable powers in life support re-
fusal cases comes from their being unencumbered by the many
limitations that have attended natural death act directives. As an ex-
pression of an incompetent patient's current wishes, the prior compe-
tent statement appears to many courts"3 4 and to the President's Com-
mission the most preferable choice." 5 Given the changes of the last
decade, there is a need to alter legislation dealing with both natural
death act directives to physicians and the appointment of health care
surrogates.
Natural death acts have been passed in thirty seven states.'
5607 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-6.1 (1984), §§ 23-4.10-1 to 23-4.10-2
(Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-501, 62-5-502 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
59-7-2.1 to 59-7-2.4 (Repl. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-101 to 34-6-107 (Repl. 1984);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-501, 75-5-502
(Repl. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3051, 3502 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE §§ 11-9.1-11-
9.2 (Repl. 1984 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.94.010-11.94.900 (Supp.
1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 39-4-1 to 39-4-7 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 243.07 (West
1987); WYO. STAT. §§ 3-5-101 to 3-5-103 (Supp. 1985).
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2412.5 (West Supp. 1987); 1987 III. Laws 85-701; Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 449.740 (1987) (requires substantial conformity with statutory short form); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 58 § 1051 (West Supp. 1986); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20 § 5603 (Purdon 1985); R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 24-4.10-1 to 24-4.10-2 (1986) (requires use of statutory short forms). Compare N.Y.
Op. Attny Gen. 84-F16 (If the Power of Attorney states intention to discontinue life support
system, attorney in fact may order discontinuance; otherwise he has no authority to terminate
life-sustaining procedures).
133. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-
1984, 28 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Torres, 357 N.W.2d
332 (Minn. 1984); Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., Garger, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184,
423 N.Y.2d 550 (1979), modified, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), cert denied sub
nom., Storer v. Storer, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
135. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
136. Alabama Termination of Life-Support Procedures, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-
8A-10 (1984 & Supp. 1986); Alaska Act Relating to the Rights of the Terminally Ill, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 3210 (1986); Arkansas Death with Dignity Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-
3801 to 82-3804 (Supp. 1985); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1987); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to 15-18-113 (1985); Connecticut Death with Dignity Act, 1985
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They typically provide that if the maker is unable to give instruc-
tions, is terminally ill and death is imminent the process of dying
should not be extended through extraordinary means.1 37 Some states
have further limited the ability to use a directive by requiring a pe-
riod of deliberation after the diagnosis of terminal illness," 8 making
them ineffective during the pregnancy of the patient,' making them
effective for only a limited number of years"' ° and prohibiting their
CONN. AcTs 606 (Reg. Sess.); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-2508 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421
to 6-2430 (Supp. 1987); Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-
765.15 (West 1984); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-3 to 31-32-6
(1984); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 3270-1 to 3270-27
(Supp. 1986); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502 to 39-4505, 39-4506 (Supp.
1987); Illinois Living Will Act, I11. REV. STAT. ch. 110 /, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd 1987), as
amended 1987 I1. Pub. Act Nos. 85-860 & 85-189; Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging
Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to 16-8-11-22 (Burns Supp. 1986); Iowa
Right to Decline Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-144A.11
(West Supp. 1987); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101-65-28,109
(1979); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-
40:1299.58.10 (West Supp. 1987); Maine Living Will Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 22, §§
2921-2923 (West Supp. 1987); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to 5-614 (Supp. 1987); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life Sustaining
Mechanisms, Miss. CODE. ANN §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121 (West Supp. 1987); Missouri Act,
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-459.025 (Vermont Supp. 1987); Nevada Withholding or With-
drawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-449.680 (1977); New
Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:l to 137-H:16 (1985); New
Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-11 (1986); North Carolina
Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-323 (1985); Oklahoma Natural Death
Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1985); Oregon Rights with Re-
spect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-97.090 (1984); South Carolina, 1986
S.C. ACTS R360; Tennessee Right to Natural Death, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to 32-
11-110 (Supp. 1987); Texas Natural Death Act, TEX. CIV. CODE § 4590h (Vernon 1977);
Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 75-2-1118
(1985); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262
(1981); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to 54-325.8:12 (Supp.
1987); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905
(Supp. 1979); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W.VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10
(1984); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-154.15 (West Supp.
1987); Wyoming Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to 35-22-109 (1984).
137. California Health & Safety Code section 7188 provides for a directive which states:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to
be terminal . . . and where the application of life-sustaining procedures would
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and . . . my death is
imminent . . . I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1987).
138. Id. §§ 7188, 7191.
139. Id. § 7188 (West Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1987);
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1984).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4504 (Supp. 1987).
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application to withholding food and fluids.141 As mentioned, they
also expressed distrust of persons with conflicting interests such as
members of the family, heirs, physicians and others by prohibiting
them from providing the necessary witnessing of the documents. 4"
The strictness and vagueness of provisions has proved trouble-
some. Commentators noticed that about half of the California pa-
tients who were diagnosed as having a "terminal condition" did not
remain conscious for the two additional weeks before they became
legally entitled to make a binding directive. 3 A terminal condition
is defined in the California law as one in which death is imminent
regardless of the life sustaining procedures used. 44 As the Presi-
dent's Commission noted, survival to complete a directive "would re-
quire a miraculous cure, a mis-diagnosis, or a very loose definition of
the word 'imminent.' ",146 In fact, those who could properly execute a
directive had little incentive to do so because the act merely allowed
the termination of treatment that could not prevent their imminent
death. Although the statute was drafted with Karen Quinlan's case
in mind, Ms. Quinlan would not have benefited from the Act since
her death was not imminent.
Although the acts typically reserve common law rights irrespec-
tive of the utilization of a statutory directive, 46 the common law has
been sparse. Had case law been better developed, there would have
been no original need for natural death acts or their very recent
adoption by many states.
The Acts cannot be viewed as an effective response to the
problems of life support termination. Data on their effect on medical
practice is contradictory, but demonstrates at least that they have not
become a central manner of resolving life support termination deci-
sions. 17 There is some indication that the presence of the statute has
led many doctors to regard the absence of a directive as rejecting
termination of life support despite the fact that their patient may
141. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-104 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-12 (1985).
142. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.122.030 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4504 (Supp. 1987).
143. Redleaf, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians'
Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 928 (1979) [hereinafter Redleaf].
144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187 (West Supp. 1987).
145. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 142.
146. California Health and Safety Code section 7193 states: "[Niothing in this chapter
shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility which any person may have to
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1987).
147. Redleaf, supra note 143, at 945.
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have had contrary expectations.14
Despite its inadequacies, most states have now adopted a natu-
ral death act. Many of the Acts avoid some of the problems of the
California prototype but, in the main, they copy it. Since the formal-
ities of execution differ from state to state, there remains the addi-
tional problem that a directive executed in one state which has a
natural death act will not qualify in another which has a differing
one.
In 1985, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted an
act entitled the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. 4 While
its adoption would eliminate inconsistencies and assure the effective-
ness of directives in other states, it carries forward most of the
problems of its progenitor. Only "qualified patients" are entitled to
the benefits of the Act.1 50 A condition to being "qualified" is a prior
diagnosis of terminal illness."' Fortunately, the Act does not also
carry forward the California limitation on making directives."' Any
person who is at least 18 and of sound mind may do so at any
time."' Since revocation remains possible indefinitely, and can be
exercised irrespective of "competency,"1 "" that change brings the
benefits of rumination and deliberation without limiting the effects of
later perspectives. 5
When the patient is "no longer able to make decisions regarding
administration of life-sustaining treatment" '56 attending physicians
shall either act in accordance with the declaration or transfer the
patient.5 The directive may request the termination of treatment
which, "when administered to a patient, will only serve to prolong
the dying process." '158 It is difficult to imagine a treatment that could
148. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 144.
149. UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL Acr, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1985).
150. Id. § 2.
151. Id. § 1.
152. Id. § 2(a).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 4(a). The individual may revoke the directive at any time and in any manner
regardless of the individual's mental or physical condition as long as the revocation is commu-
nicated to the physician. The intention of the Commission on Uniform State Laws is to allow
an individual freedom to revoke the directive at any time without the encumbrance of compli-
cated procedural requirements.
155. The intended result might be better achieved by a provision making the directive
ineffective while the maker objects to its effectuation. Revocation normally denies the maker
future use of the directive since the maker will likely be found incompetent to execute it anew.
156. Id. § 3(ii).
157. Id. But seeJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (transfer not permitted even
on moral grounds).
158. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Ac, 9B U.L.A. 609 § 2(b) (1985).
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ethically be administered only to prolong dying even without a direc-
tive. Karen Quinlan would certainly again not qualify. Further, the
Uniform Act nullifies a declaration to end life support for a pregnant
woman whose fetus could "develop to the point of live birth with the
continued application of life-sustaining treatment" unless the direc-
tive otherwise provides " ' (the model declaration in the statute makes
no mention of the issue).? 0 It also expressly rejects mercy-killing or
euthanasia negatively using three different verbs (it does not con-
done, authorize or approve) for emphasis. 6
The presumption against life support termination for a preg-
nant woman in her first trimester, at least, seems clearly unconstitu-
tional on privacy grounds. 6 The state's interest in the woman's life
which provides balance for her interest in limiting her consent to
unwanted medical treatment (especially that which merely prolongs
the dying process) is quite weak. The state's interest in preventing
what is essentially an abortion of the fetus if she dies before it can be
saved must be even more subordinated to the woman's choice. " It
cannot be required that she must remain alive though dying when in
the normal case she is not required to consent to the use of her
healthy body at least in the early months of pregnancy. 64 The de-
nunciation of euthanasia is equally unfortunate in its lumping of ac-
tive and passive euthanasia. While these terms are also quite impre-
cise, they connote the distinction between actively causing death as
by administering a lethal agent for the sole purpose of killing and
more passive acts such as decisions to forego resuscitation or removal
of life support. The former is still generally anathema in the medical
community 6" and is only recently becoming accepted by the general
public. 66 The latter has growing support from both groups.1 67
159. Id. § 6(c).
160. Id. § 2(b). The declaration, which requires two witnesses states:
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition that will cause my death
within a relatively short time, and I am no longer able to make decisions re-
garding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant -to the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw
treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary to my
comfort or to alleviate pain.
Id.
161. Id. § 10(g).
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (App. D.C. 1987).
164. Id.
165. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS v.2
234-35 (1982).
166. Id. See also infra note 176.
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While the attitude of the medical community ought not to be deter-
minative of such issues 68 it is of political importance.
In a subtler fashion, the Uniform Act shifts control further in
the direction of the medical community. Several acts are criminalized
by the proposed statute. Failure to record a declaration provided by
the patient, altering, concealing or coercing the making of a declara-
tion or its revocation are typical.1" 9 Also criminalized is the failure of
a doctor who does not wish to comply with the directive to "as
promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps" to see to the pa-
tient's transfer.1 "' The refusal to comply is expressly not proscribed
and, indeed, physicians are expressly immunized from civil and
criminal responsibility as well as professional discipline for actions
under the Act which "are in accord with reasonable medical stan-
dards." ' The qualified transfer provision begs the most difficult
question: what if after reasonable steps the doctor is unable to trans-
fer the patient? Does the patient's wish or the doctor's govern? That,
after all, is the central subject of the legislation.
One provision of the Uniform Act is particularly worthy of fu-
ture adoption, however. It provides that the declaration may be re-
voked by the patient at any time and in any manner without regard
to mental or physical condition. 2 While such a provision leaves
open a great potential for manipulation it wisely recognizes the ulti-
mate preference for life when in doubt as to the patient's wishes.
There should be a counterpart provision that a reinstatement of a
declaration is acceptable on similar terms so that the underlying doc-
ument is not lost because of a recanted expression of changed inten-
tions. This purpose might be accomplished, for example, by provid-
ing that life support not be removed from patients whose last
expressed wish was to have it maintained but that the validity of the
directive would not be affected unless it was validly formally
revoked.
VI.
While both the model act and the extant statutes fix earlier and
more naive notions, case law has made many advances in dealing
with specific cases. New legislation is required to consolidate the
167. See infra note 176.
168. See cases cited supra note 82.
169. UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1985).
170. Id. § 7.
171. Id. § 8(b).
172. Id. § 4(a).
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benefits of both the individual directive and the appointment of a
medical surrogate for that purpose. For some persons, appointing
trusted friends who understand one's point of view will be a good
solution given the complexity of circumstances in which the need for
a surrogate decision may be required. In other cases, there may be
no one sufficiently trusted or available. A directive with necessarily
more general provisions may be best in such instances. Combining
both would be even more prudent. A document encompassing both
would better deserve the'name "living will."' 8
There are several changes which should be captured by such a
new law. It should state the competent patient's right to refuse any
type of treatment as well as any other form of care which is objec-
tionable without qualifying the circumstances for such a decision. A
patient should have the opportunity to prepare a directive to that
effect but it should be suspended during a period in which he repu-
diates its direction whether competent or not. No one's life should be
ended over his protest even if competency determinations were un-
controversial. A surrogate, named in the directive, should be author-
ized to interpret the patient's wishes in specific circumstances. Physi-
cians should be obligated to follow the directions provided or to
transfer the patient. In cases in which transfer is medically inappro-
priate, doctors should comply with the directive. Failure to do so
should be grounds for professional punishment and legal liability.
Public opinion is increasingly accepting the right to choose
death as an alternative to treatment." 4 Case law is slowly promoting
it'.. and medical opinion has come to accept both more patient con-
trol and a greater range of choice in life support removal." 6 One
173. ALEXANDER, supra note 131.
174. See, e.g., Aid-In-Dying Act Well Received, 23 HEMLOCK Q. 1 (1986); SOCIETY
FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-1984 7-8 (1984).
175. See cases cited supra note 82.
176. See, e.g., SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS
1981-1984. 3-6 (1984). "Recent opinion polls in the Netherlands show that the majority of the
Dutch population (56%) do not object to interventions taken to shorten the lives of terminally
ill patients. Only about 23% of the population take a definite stand against euthanasia. The
number of opponents to euthanasia decreased from about 48% in 1972 to about 43% in 1976
and to 23% in 1979." HILHORST, RELIGION AND EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS: ON
THE CLARIFICATION OF Two OPPOSITE FACTORS 9 (1982). "According to the most recent
poll in 1985, 67 per cent have no objection against active euthanasia and 84% are not against
passive euthanasia." Admiraal, Active Voluntary Euthanasia, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 186
(1986).
In 1985, "[oine-sixth of all the people who died in Holland, some 20,000 people, were
killed by doctors on purpose, and not one of those doctors went to jail, even though it is illegal
to practice euthanasia." 60 Minutes: The Last Right? (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 1986).
The Euthanasia Society in the Netherlands has been working to make active euthanasia legal.
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must still question the extent to which patient autonomy ideals are
However, active euthanasia is "classed in the criminal code as a form of murder punishable by
up to 12 years in prison. But so long as doctors meet medical and ethical criteria developed in
a series of judicial decision since 1973 they are seldom prosecuted." Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1987,
at 11, col. 4. These standards have also been incorporated into guidelines promulgated by the
Dutch Medical Association. The doctor may not actively euthanize a patient unless the request
comes from the patient, himself/herself; the patient must be competent and fully conscious;
and the patient must ask repeatedly for the procedure. In addition, the patient must have
physical or mental suffering which is deemed to be unbearable, and there must be no chance
for improvement. Id.
"Efforts to get clarifying legislation on euthanasia through the Dutch Parliament have
thus far failed; the issue splits the two parties in the governing coalition. The Christian.Demo-
crats prefer keeping euthanasia a crime, with very limited exceptions; the small Liberal Party
would like to move toward legalization. The government still hopes to have a proposal ready
for debate this fall but is having a hard time working one out." Id. at 11, col. 4.
Doctors are usually not prosecuted for engaging in active euthanasia if the judicially cre-
ated guidelines are followed. However, because the prosecution decision is left in the hands of
the 2090 local prosecutors, doctors are uncertain as to whether they will be prosecuted. Id. For
example, a doctor in Amsterdam was charged with administering active euthanasia in the case
of a thirty-two year old multiple sclerosis victim. He was tried at The Hague, and he admitted
that he had given the patient a fatal injection. Because the patient was in a great deal of pain
and facing a terminal illness, the judge found that the doctor was faced with a conflict: his duty
to the patient and his duty to obey the law. The judge found him not guilty. 60 Minutes: The
Last Right? (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 1986). On the other hand, in the sixty-five cases
of active euthanasia reported to the Ministry of Justice, nine resulted in prosecution. Wall St.
J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 11, col. 4.
Therefore, it seems that the reality in the Netherlands is that people are allowed to plan
their deaths due to the availability of euthanasia. However, the government has not sanctioned
the practice. Courts are forced to indulge in a legal fiction that adherence to guidelines means
that no crime has been committed although it is clear the letter of the law is broken.
In California there is an initiative proposed for the November 1988 ballot which would
allow physician assisted euthanasia. It has not qualified for the ballot as of this writing. The
proposed amendment to the California Civil Code is the Humane and Dignified Death Act,
which specifically provides that a patient who is terminally ill may sign a written directive
instructing his/her physician to administer aid-in-dying. For a patient to be considered termi-
nal, a medical decision must be made that the patient's condition is incurable in the opinion of
two physicians. The Act defines "aid-in-dying" as any medical procedure that will end the life
of the patient swiftly, painlessly, and humanely. The directive is revocable by destroying the
instrument, by a separate written instrument or by a verbal expression of revocation. See
supra note 155. Procedurally, the Act is very similar to the provisions of the durable power of
attorney for health care set forth in California Civil Code sections 2430-2444. See supra note
155 The same formalities are required for execution, it remains in effect for seven years unless
the patient is then comatose in which case it continues in effect until the person regains the
ability to communicate. In addition, it offers immunity from criminal and civil liability to the
physician and health care facility if they comply with the terms of the act.
The directive is considered to be a conclusive presumption that its terms reflect the pa-
tient's wishes. However, there are built-in safeguards. The decision to administer aid-in-dying
must be reviewed by a hospital committee of three persons to assure all of the following: (1)
the directive was properly executed; (2) the directive has not been revoked; (3) two physicians
have determined that the patient's condition is terminal; and (4) the time of death is properly
decided by the surrogate decision maker. The act also contains a statutory form which will
effectuate its terms.
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actually incorporated into medical practice.
Even expressed agreements which seems to prevail cannot be
trusted to have changed procedures well entrenched in a prior time
when the patient's participation in decision making was less valued.
One must still inquire to what extent competent patients are con-
sulted about their wishes, especially life and death decisions?... A
study completed by the President's Commission found that 41% of
physicians would either provide the patient with a straight forward,
statistically based prognosis for the disease or tell the patient that it
is likely that he will die within a year. However, only 41% of physi-
cians surveyed said they would provide the patient with a hard esti-
mate." 8 The survey undertaken by the Stanford Law Review"7 9
177. A perspective may be obtained by looking at the procedures of Stanford University
Hospital with respect to do not resuscitate orders. OFFICE MEMORANDUM FROM STANFORD
UNIV. MEDICAL CENTER COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS TO STANFORD UNIV. MEDICAL
CENTER, MEDICAL NURSING AND PATIENT SUPPORT STAFF (Jan. 1985) (Draft Ethics Com-
mittee Mailing #2). It begins with a recognition of the importance of patient participation:
We would like to feel confident that DNR orders at the Stanford University
Hospital are consistently executed with knowledge by and the informed consent
from patients or their legal guardians. We are aware of many instances of com-
petent patients who have clearly and consistently requested not to be resusci-
tated and who still end up undergoing CPR. At the other end of the spectrum,
the potential for problems in communication at a major teaching hospital re-
garding this issue . . .[is shown by a study which concluded that] of 157 physi-
cians responsible for care of patients who underwent CPR at Beth Israel (Bos-
ton) Hospital in 1981, 151 professed to believe that patients of families should
be involved in DNR decisions. However, of the 154 patients who were resusci-
tated, only 19% actually discussed this with their doctors, and only 33% of the
families were consulted. Further interviews with 24 mentally competent patients
who survived resuscitation revealed only weak correlation between patient and
physician perception of any communication that did take place.
Id.
To insure that patients be afforded better opportunities for participation, Stanford distrib-
utes a Patients' Rights and Responsibilities statement which includes an invitation to discuss
"issues of withdrawing or withholding of life support in the setting of terminal illness" with
their physician and to obtain further information at the Patient Relations Office. The policy
statement itself, however, is less encompassing. A "No Code" order should be considered when
the patient has an irreversible, incurable medical condition and death is expected to occur as a
result of the patient's underlying medical problems. Once these criteria are satisfied, then the
attending physician must exercise his or her best judgment to determine whether a no code
order is appropriate. (emphasis added).
The hospital distributes copies of both directive to physicians and durable power for
health care forms for those who chose to contact the Patient Relations Office and presumably
acts consistently with their requirements when they are made known, the exclusion of both the
patient and the family from those who must exercise judgment about no codes probably is
simply inartful.
178. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS v. 2
223 (1982).
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shortly after the passage of the California Natural Death Act, 80
found a gap between physician views that patients had a right to
make informed decisions about life support after they are diagnosed
to be terminally ill and assuring that they were informed. Some as-
sumed that other doctors had informed them. Others were euphemis-
tic in their descriptions (for example suggesting that the patient put
his affairs in order). Some informed the family but not the patient. A
small percentage (7%) indicated that they sometimes did not tell pa-
tients even if neither they nor their family knew independently.181
All answers were self assessments. It seems likely that the answers
overstated the information that was actually passed.
The active public discussion of death issues will probably in-
crease the amount of information that patients have. Many more
persons will have heard of the issues concerning life support and will
know to ask about them. Members of the family and friends will
likewise probe more. Each experience of a close friend dying in a
hospital will also increase the sophistication of those who participate
in making late life choices or hear about their being made. Doctors
will likely improve in their communication and consultation as their
audience learns to expect participation. Thus, it may now be possible
to use a device as new as a living will on a larger scale.
If living wills are to be effective for more than a small group of
the well-informed, there will have to be a commitment to providing
publicity about the options available. The general public will have to
be urged to consider life-end issues earlier in their lives and model
living wills will have to be made easily available. The fact that as
many as five million have already chosen to draft directives under
the present unfavorable circumstances 82 indicates that there is po-
tential for involving a far larger number.
There is insufficient data to determine the costs of providing
only as much life support as patients want. It seems quite probable
that the costs are less than the amount spent at the moment. Prior
systems of health reimbursement which compensated health provid-
ers for service provided with little control of the extent of treatment,
medical predilections for life over death (a normally excellent per-
spective) and a growing concern for potential legal liability have no
doubt kept many patients in treatment when they would have pre-
ferred an earlier death. Reimbursement reform combined with relief
179. Redleaf, supra note 143.
180. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1987).
181. Redleaf, supra note 143, at 929.
182. See Nelson, supra note 23.
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from concern about exposure to law suits should make a noticeable
difference. Given the reluctance to cut health care resources that has
existed to date, the government and private employers may be will-
ing to support the amount of medical life support that is desired. In
any event, the adjustments should diminish the reductions that are
made if further cost cutting measures are instituted. There is reason
to believe that many patients with incurable and ultimately terminal
diseases seek to be spared the full course of possible treatment to
keep them alive." '
If no changes in present practices are made, on the other hand,
the threat of reductions by changes in medical standards of care
seems quite likely. In an egalitarian manner, all would be denied
some of the less promising forms of life support. Given the higher
percentage of older patients who chose to end dialysis support,184 one
could conclude that dialysis might properly be age restricted in the
British manner. Certainly, dialysis was less effective for older and
diabetic patients than for the general population. On the other hand,
it should be noted that a majority of patients continued treatment at
least during the minimum year they were studied. For them, un-
availability would have meant death.
Generally, egalitarian reductions would result in denying per-
sons who feel strongly about continuing to "fight" death irrespective
of odds the resources to do so as well as likely keeping many alive
after they pass their own point of decision to die. Denying the for-
mer group its preference would be even more acceptable at a time of
resource depletion in which funds for such people could only be ob-
tained by increasing the risks to the remainder of those requiring
health care.
183. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 95-100.
184. See supra note 16.
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